Without a doubt the youth have played an essential role in the removal of Omar Al-Bashir, the former president of Sudan frompower in 11 April 2019, where they have shown great resolve to ensure that the slogans of the revolution of freedom, peace and justice will be achieved.
A key success that was achieved through them was the protestors forced the Transitional Military Council[TMC] that was led by both Lt.General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan and Lt.General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemetti” his vice chairmen to accepting a power sharing agreement that was signed into place on 5 July.
That agreement has brought into place Abdella Hamdok’s transitional government on 5 September 2019 where it has been working in good faith in implementing the manifesto of the DFCF. Nonetheless, as the pace of achieving those goals are understandably moving in a slow direction, the former regime has been attempting to direct those frustration into creating chaos during the transition process.
When did the uprising start?
The success of the current uprising could be traced back to the previous revolts of 2011-2013 and the civil-disobedience of 2017. As the youth in Tunisa and Egypt have used social media platforms in mobilizing the streets that successfully removed Zine Ben Ali the former president of Tunisia in 14 January and Hosni Mubarak of Egypt in 11 February, the youth in Sudan have done the same.
Amongst the common known youth groups who have used social media platforms to mobilize protest throughout the country, and are still active till today are Girifna,Sharara, Youth for Change.
Through these platforms protest were organized regularly, where pictures, videos were uploaded to spread awareness of the protest taking place, the arrest and crack downs against them too.
Nonetheless, Al-Bashir’s regime violently crack downed where both its National Intelligence and Security Services[NISS], and the Rapid Support Forces[RSF] in the reported incident of 2013 youth groups have changed their tactics.
Therefore, the youth have changed those their mobilization tactics. Therefore, through using social media to call for civil disobedience of November 2016 where a campaign was lunched called for a three day standstill of the country to show the people’s resentment to Al-Bashir’s regime without fear of a violent crackdown. As that succeed similar disobedience took place on 19 December 2016.
These innovation of using social media and non-violent resistance tactics were evident in the December uprising of 2018, thereby encouraging many opposition parties who feared a crackdown and other risks of protesting to finally join the December uprising of 2018, where they formed the Declaration Forces of Freedom and Change[DFCF] in 1 January 2019.
Where is the frustration coming from?
With the youth succeeding in removing Al-Bashir from power, they have continued their protest in front of the Military Headquarters[MHQ] demanding that the TMC hand power to a civilian led government.
However, while they continued their protest the youth were frustrated by the slow pace of the negotiations between the DFCF, and the TMC. Equally important, the youth were becoming frustrated with what they perceived as the delay tactics by the TMC to hand power.
In 15 May the TMC has suspended talks for 72 hours, where the suspension of negotiations is regrettable…and ignores the reality of the revolutionaries who are increasingly angry as a result of the bloodshed and the souls that we lost, said the DFCF.
That frustration has increased further when the TMC security forces have forcefully cleared the protest site on 3 June, killing more than 110 people, and where many others were either wounded, injured or lost.
Moreover, after the clearing of the protest site, the TMC have shown that it was not willing to transfer power to civilian rule. Elections will take place within nine month said Al-Burhan the chairman of the TMC on the evening of 3 June, which have effectively angered the youth.
Feeling let down by the transition talks, during this time supporters of the former regime have started to channel that frustration through creating rumours against the DFCF. Although, these rumours did not stop many of the youth to see their interest is to gather more protest on 30 June,2019, where by effectively forcing the TMC to sign the power sharing agreement on 5 July, 2019 still those rumours persisted even after Hamdok, the prime minister has formed his government.
How are they being used?
With Hamdok’s government in place there were high expectations that Hamdok would move with great speed to implement economic reforms to salvage the country’s battered economy, where the youth unemployment stood around 27 percent in 2019, and where 10 Billion Dollars were required to savage the economy as said by Hamdok.
However, it Hamdok’s goal has been hampered by the US insistence of keeping Sudan in its list of states that sponsor terrorism, which is blocking both investment opportunities to and its ability to get debt relief.
At the same time the country is facing constant security threats that made it difficult for the youth to maintain their patience with the slow pace of reforms taking place. Tribal clashes erupt again in Port Sudan for the second time after a reconciliation accord was signed on 8 September.
The clashes are a result of the former regime selling the port to foreign companies who are laying off numbers of workers, unknowingly disrupting the social balance within the port city, that is between the tribes of Beni Ameer and the Nuba.
Likewise, the dismantling of the NCP and the removal of the NCP members and supporters within the institutions of the country that is taking longer than expected has further frustrated a lot of the youths patience with the transition process, there by encouraging supporters of the former regime to channel those frustration against the transitional government.
Therefore, on 15 January protest calls were being circulated through social media calling for protest in front of the MHQ to give the Sudanese Armed Forces to legitimacy to takeover power, most like to give officers who support the former regime the backing to takeover power.
With reports of the retirement/dismissal of junior officers who protected the protestors during the April protest in front of the MHQ calls were made for protestors to gather against the dismissal of those officers, resulting in the clashes that took place on 21 February. It later became apparent that some of those clashes were most likely instigated by supporters of the former regime to create further security to undermine the transitional government.
What is to be expected?
As some progress are being made in the peace talks with groups of Darfur and groups of Eastern Sudan it is highly likely that the supporters of the former regime will continue to create periodic chaos to hinder any reforms that the transitional government is carrying out, especially during the ongoing negotiations with the two factions of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/ Army[SPLM/A].
They will try to further use the frustrations of the youth who have high expectations who are highly susceptible for protest unless they know from where the protest calls are coming from.
However, there is a possible solution to hinder the supporters of the former regime’s use of the youth’s frustration. The government could consider creating strategies and agendas that will give the youth a direct say, contribution, and involvement in the transition process.
That will help the government understand what are the youth’s expectations, and in the same time will allow the youth to be partners in the transition process.
Jihad Mashamoun is a Sudanese political analyst who authored and co-authored numerous articles on Sudan and the Sudanese uprisings.
Twitter: @ComradeJihad
